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Informed Consent:
The Right of Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Treatment
Sarah MacKenzie*
The right to refuse treatment, whether in physical or mental illness, is clearly established
in common law and protected under s. 7 of the Charter. Some provincial statutes, such
as the Nova Scotia Hospitals Act, expressly or implicitly violate this right of psychiatric
patients. In most cases, legislation does not provide sufficient guidance to the medical
profession to protect these rights in practice. It is recommended that reform is needed in
mental health law, particularly with respect to informed consent, the meaning and limit of
emergency treatment, therapeutic privilege, and the process of determining substitute
consent-givers. Legislatures and courts must strike a balance between the relief from
suffering and the right to liberty and self-determination when dealing with the medical
treatment ofpsychiatric patients.

Le droit de refuser un traitement, que ce soit pour un probleme physique ou mental, est
clairement etabli par le droit commun et protege par ['article 7 de la Charte. Certaines
Lois provinciales tel/es que la Loi sur !es Hopitaux en Nouvelle-Ecosse, explicitement ou
implicitement transgressent ce droit qu 'ont les patients psychiatriques. En pratique, dans
la plupart des cas, la legislation ne fournit pas suffisamment de direction a la profession
medicate pour proteger ces droits. Des reformes sont recommandees dans le domaine du
droit de la sante mentale, pariculierement en ce qui concerne l 'obtention du
consentement du patient en connaissance de cause, la definition et !es limites qu traitment
d'urgence, le privilege therapeutique, et Les personnes aptes a donner le consentement
requis si le patient, lui-meme, ne peut pas. Les legislatures et !es cours doivent trouver
une balance entre le soulagement de la souffrance et le droit a la liberte et l'autodetermination lorsqu'il s'agit du traitement medical des patients psychiatriques.

The right to refuse medical treatment is a well-established principle in common
law, 1 and, since the entrenchment of the Charter,2 a constitutional imperative. 3 A
physician who fails to obtain an informed consent prior to treatment is liable for

*
1

Dalhousie Law School, LL.B. anticipated 1993.

Malette v. Schulman (1990), 72 O.R. (2d) 417 (C.A.).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. [hereinafter Charter].
3 Fleming v. Reid (1991), 4 O.R .. (3d) 74 (C.A.).

2
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a civil action in battery or negligence. 4 Legislation that expressly or implicitly
pennits forcible treatment is ripe for constitutional challenge.
The care of mental health patients in Canadian provinces and in both
territories is presently governed by legislation. Although ten years have passed
since the Charter was adopted and twelve years since the Supreme Court set out
the requirements for informed consent in Reihl v. Hughes, 5 most provincial
legislation concerned with mental health care continues to violate the patient's
fundamental right to bodily integrity. 6
This discrepancy between principle and· practice is a result of two main
factors. On the one hand, civil actions in battery and negligence and challenges
to unconstitutional legislation have been few and far between, primarily as a
result of the disempowered position of the mental health consumer. On the other
hand, provincial legislatures have failed to take a proactive stance towards
reform in the area of mental health law. This neglect is likely attributable both
to the stigma associated with mental illness and the enduring tradition of
paternalism in the medical profession itself.?
The exercise by the state of its parens patriae power 8 fulfills a legitimate
need; individuals suffering from psychiatric disorders or emotional disturbances
are vulnerable and often require protection. In Canada, however, the trend
towards greater patient autonomy compels the circumscription of this power by
the legal right to refuse treatment. 9 In the words of one author, "elitism and
4

Reihl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880.
Ibid.
6 See Appendix for summary; Mental Health Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. M-10; Mental
Health Act, R.S.Y.T. 1986, c. 115; Mental Health Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. M-6; Mental
Patients Protection Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. P-41; Mental Health Act, S:A. 1988, c. M-13.1;
Mental Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 256, as am. S.B.C. 1981, c. 21; Mental Health Act,
R.S.M. 1987, c. M-110 as am. S.M. 1987-88, c. 56, S.M. 1991-92, c. 4; Mental Health
Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-10 as am. S.N.B. 1989, c. 23; Mental Health Act, R.S.N. 1990,
c. M-9.
7 Paternalism has been a dominant feature of medical practice since its inception. In On
Decorum, Hippocrates advised physicians to "perform [their duties] calmly and adroitly,
concealing most things from the patient while you are attending to him." [Decorum XVI
of the Hippocratic Corpus, vol. 2, trans. Jones (1923), p. 297.]
8 The traditional justification for the infringement of the rights of the mentally ill is 1) the
need to protect society as a whole from imminent danger ("police power"), and 2) the
obligation of the state to care for those members of society unable to care for themselves
(parens patriae). The latter justification is most frequently invoked. See E. (Mrs.) v. E.,
[ 1986] 2 S.C.R. 388 for a discussion of the application of this doctrine in Canada.
9 I have attempted to limit the scope of my research to Canadian sources. Much of the
material written on this subject has focused on American precedent due to the deluge of
cases dealing with these issues in the U.S.(e.g. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342; Rennie
v. Klein 462 F. Supp. 1294). However, over the past decade there has been significant
development in the case law in Canada, aspects of which are distinct from the American
5
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paternalism are out, individualism and self-determination are in." 10 A conflict
exists between the power of the state, exercised through the agency of
psychiatrists, and the liberty of the individual, espoused by the common law and
entrenched in the Charter. Provincial legislatures, accordingly, must engage in
the difficult task of balancing patient rights with patient needs.
This paper examines the statutory consent process, outlined in the Nova
Scotia Hospitals Act, 11 after the preliminary determinations of admission status
and competency have been made. On its face, the statute adheres to the
requirements of the Charter and respects the common law right to selfdetermination. The consent of the competent psychiatric patient, or the consent
of a proxy if the patient is incompetent, is required before treatment can be
administered, even if the patient has been committed involuntarily.12
Nevertheless, these provisions do not adequately protect the right to refuse
treatment; a gap exists between the prima facie intent of the legislation and its
impact in operation. The written law in Nova Scotia must be compared with its
practical effect in order to identify the deficiencies in the legislation and suggest
avenues for reform.

THE COMMON LAW
The Right to Refuse Treatment

The common law principle that no person may invade the bodily integrity of
another without their consent 13 was recently affirmed by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Malette v. Schulman. 14 A physician who disregarded an express
refusal of blood transfusions - written on a card in the patient's purse - was
found liable for battery even though the treatment had saved the woman's life.
Justice Robins clearly set out the law on this issue:
A competent adult is generally entitled to reject a specific
treatment or all treatment, or to select an alternate form of
treatment, even if the decision may entail risks as serious as
death and may appear mistaken in the eyes of the medical
profession or of the community. Regardless of the doctor's
opinion, it is the patient who has the final say on whether to
approach. Therefore, there is a need for a survey of Canadian cases and commentary in
order to identify the state of the law in this area at present.
10 Davies, "The Quality of Consent for Health Care: Rationalizing What is Ideal with
What is Achievable" (1986) 7 Health Law in Canada 3.
11 Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 208.
12 Ibid. SS. 52(2) and 36(2).
I3 Mulloy v. Hop Sang, [1935] 1 W.W.R. 714 (Alta. C.A.).
14 Supra note 1.
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undergo the treatment. 15
The right of a competent adult to refuse treatment, regardless of the
consequences, is an undisputed issue.

Consent
Underlying this right is the physician's obligation to obtain the patient's
consent prior to treatment. A valid consent must be specific, voluntary, given by
a competent person, and informed. 16
Specific - The consent must be specific to the procedure performed; a general
consent authorizing a physician to perform any necessary procedures is not by
itself legally valid. It may be used as evidence that a properly informed consent
has been obtained, but it is not conclusive. 17
Voluntary- The consent must be free of undue influence either in the form of a
sanction or reward. It may be argued that it is impossible to obtain a truly
voluntary consent in an institutional setting, such as a prison or mental hospital,
because of the coercion inherent in such an environment. In the view of one
psychiatric nurse, a coercive approach is frequently taken to administer
medication:
At present, we cannot force a competent patient who refuses it
to take medication. Yet it is not an uncommon practice for a
nurse to offer this same patient medication in his or her room,
in the presence of several other staff members. Compulsory
treatment? Maybe. Coercive? Probably. But in the clinical
judgement of many nurses, not taking such actions would
leave them vulnerable to potential injury as well as accusations
of neglect. 18

Competence - Only a competent person can give a valid consent to treatment.
Competence has been defined as "the intellectual ability to reach a reasoned
choice about treatment." 19 Generally, a "reasoned choice" requires the ability to
appreciate the nature and consequences of the proposed treatment. 20
15

Ibid. at 10.
Savage & McKague, Mental Health Law in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) at
100-105; see also Rozovsky & Rozovsky, Canadian Law of Consent to Treatment
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1990) at 2-3.
17 Savage, Ibid. at 101; Rozovsky, Ibid. at 12.
18 Schreiber, "Compulsory Treatment of Schizophrenia: A Nurse's Perspective"(l988), 9
Health Law in Canada 18.
19 Rozovsky, supra note 16 at 5.
20 Most provincial statutes contain these criteria for the determination of competence.
Section 52(2) of Nova Scotia's Hospitals Act also requires an assessment of "whether or
16
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Information - A physician is required to disclose any risks of the proposed

treatment that would be material to a reasonable person in the patient's position
in making his or her decision. In addition, the physician must inform the patient
of special or unusual risks as well as answer any questions he or she may have. 21
Common risks, or risks of which the doctor knows the patient is aware, need not
be disclosed unless there is a specific inquiry. 22

The Requirement of Information
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Hopp v. Lepp, imposed an obligation on
Canadian physicians to disclose "the nature of the proposed operation, its
gravity, any material risks and any special or unusual risks attendant upon the
performance of the operation." 23 In a subsequent decision, Reihl v. Hughes, 24
the Supreme Court applied this standard of disclosure and proceeded to make
three further changes in the law. 25 First, aside from a claim for battery where no
consent had been obtained at all, an action for negligence could be brought if the
patient consented on the basis of inadequate information, provided by the
physician, on the material risks of the treatment. Second, after Reihl v. Hughes,
the appropriate test to assess the quantity and quality of information to provide
was no longer what a reasonable physician would decide to disclose, 26 but rather
what a reasonable person in the patient's position would want to know. Finally,
to establish negligence, the Court required the plaintiff to prove that the failure
to inform caused the damage suffered. In making this assessment, the Court
proposed the use of an objective standard; would a reasonable person in the
same position as the patient not have undergone the treatment if they had been
properly informed of the risks?
Subsequent case law has further refined the definition of the proper standard
of disclosure. 27 Material risks are "significant risks that pose a real threat to the

not his ability to consent is affected by his condition."
Hopp v. Lepp,[1980] 2 S.C.R. 192; Reiblv. Hughes, supra note 4.
22 In Anderson v. Grace Maternity Hospital et al.(1990), 93 N.S.R. 141 (S.C.T.D.) the
court held that the possibility of a Cesarean delivery, and the risks involved in that
procedure, were not required to be disclosed because certain risks are inherent in giving
birth and the plaintiff was a nurse with special knowledge of such matters.
23 Hopp v. Lepp, supra note 21 at 210.
24 Supra note 4.
25 Robertson, "Informed Consent Ten Years Later: The Impact of Reihl v. Hughes."
(1991) 70(3) Can. Bar Rev. 423 at 424.
26 See e.g. Mclean v. Weir (1977), 3 C.C.L.T. 87 (B.C.S.C.).
27 White v. Turner (1981),120 D.L.R.(3d) 269 at 284 (Ont. H.C.); Videto v. Kennedy
(1981), 125 D.L.R.(3d) 127 at 133 (Ont. C.A.); Casey v. Provan (1984),11 D.L.R.(4th)
708 (Ont. H.C.J.); Stamos v. Davies (1985), 21 D.L.R. (4th) 507 (Ont. H.C.J.); Haughian
21
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patient's life, health or comfort, " 28 although a slight chance of serious injury
may also be considered a material risk requiring disclosure. 29 Special or unusual
risks, while not "material," are nevertheless risks of which a reasonable person
in the patient's position would want to be informed. The Supreme Court seemed
unsure of the scope of this last category in Hopp v. Lepp, 30 and failed to clarify
the issue in Reihl v. Hughes. 31 Some guidance has been provided by the Ontario
High Court in White v. Turner:
As for "unusual or special risks," these are those that are not
ordinary, common, everyday matters. These are risks that are
somewhat extraordinary, uncommon, and not encountered
every day, but they are known to occur occasionally. Though
rare occurrences, because of their unusual or special character,
the Supreme Court has declared that they should be described
to a reasonable patient, even though they may not be
"material." There may, of course be an overlap between
"material risks" and "unusual or special risks." If a special or
unusual risk is quite dangerous and fairly frequently
encountered, it could be classified as a material risk. But even
if it is not very dangerous or common, an unusual or special
risk must be disclosed. 32
The distinction between material and special risks remains unclear and the
definition, particularly of special risks, will vary according to the source. 33
The physician must consider the patient's personal characteristics when
determining what degree of disclosure is required to satisfy the subjective
component of the above-noted "reasonable patient" test. The patient's
perception of his or her best interests, the patient's lifestyle, emotional
sensitivities, or religious convictions affect what constitutes "material"
information in each case. The physician's duty is not merely to inform:
The true requirement...is that the physician learn enough about
v. Paine (1987), 37 D.L.R.(4th) 624 (Sask. C.A.); The judgement in Reihl v. Hughes has
been consistently employed by Nova Scotia courts: Considine v. Camp Hill Hospital
(1982), 50 N.S.R. (2d) 631 (S.C.T.D.); Goguen v. Crowe (1988), 80 N.S.R. 36
(S.C.T.D.); Anderson v. Grace Maternity Hospital et al. (1990), 93 N.S.R.(2d)l41
(S.C.T.D.).
2 8 White v. Turner, Ibid. at 284.
29 Hopp v. Lepp, supra note 21 at 209.
30 Ibid.
31 Supra note 4.
32 White v. Turner, supra note 27 at 289.
33 For example, in Rozovsky, supra note 16 at 8, the authors describe special risks as
including "probable risks" and "possible risks" that have the potential for serious
consequences.
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the patient reasonably to know what information is material to
the patient. This may require the physician to become
reasonably informed and to ask questions and initiate
dialogue. 34
The objective test of causation places the burden on the plaintiff to establish not
only that he or she would not have consented to the procedure had this
information been provided, but that a reasonable person in the same position
would have made that same choice. Therefore, these subjective considerations
must be reasonably based.

Informed Consent in the Psychiatric Setting
The proper standard of disclosure to apply to the consent process in the
mental health field has been a matter of controversy. One view is that it is
inappropriate to give to psychiatric patients the same type of information given
to non-psychiatric patients on the grounds that most mental illnesses impair
judgment. 35 Concern has been raised that the standard definition of competency
fails to consider the emotional distress suffered by the majority of mental health
patients:
This definition [of competency] has been the subject of some
criticism, particularly by physicians who feel it is
inappropriate when applied to psychiatric patients. They
describe it as having an intellectual bias, and not sufficiently
taking into account the patient's emotional state. For example,
it is argued that a particular patient may fully understand his or
her situation, the proposed treatment, and the probable
outcome, but may:
1. refuse to make a decision at all because of emotional
distress;
2. continually alter the decision, providing no consistent basis
for treatment;
3. refuse or accept treatment believing the route chosen to be
the least likely to heip, because of overpowering guilt feelings
and a desire to be punished; or
4. make a decision on some totally irrelevant criterion, such as
at the command of 'voices.'36

34 Dickens, "Informed Choice in Medical Care", in R.S. Abella & M.L. Rothman, (eds.),
Justice Beyond 01Well (Montreal: Editions Y. Blais, 1985) 250.

35 Dr. W.O. McCormick, "'Informed Consent' in Psychiatric Practice"(l980), 1 Health
law in Canada 53. Dr. McCormick is presently Medical/Clinical Director at the Nova
Scotia Hospital.
Savage, supra note 16at116-117.

36
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This view was clearly rejected in the recent case of Fleming v. Reid.37
Justice Robins discussed the common law principles supporting the right to
refuse treatment, espoused in his earlier decision in Malette v. Shulman:38
[T]hese traditional common law principles extend to mentally
competent patients in psychiatric facilities. They, like
competent adults generally, are entitled to control the course
of their medical treatment. Their right of self-determination is
not forfeited when they enter a psychiatric facility. They may,
if they wish, reject their doctor's psychiatric advice and refuse
to take psychotropic drugs, just as patients with other forms of
illness may reject their doctor's advice and refuse, for
instance, to take insulin or undergo chemotherapy. The fact
that these patients, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, are
hospitalized in a mental institution in order to obtain care and
treatment for a mental disorder, does not necessarily render
them incompetent to make psychiatric treatment decisions. 39
This statement of the law dispels any notion that the doctrine of informed
consent does not apply to the psychiatric setting, and it implicitly rejects the use
of different criteria when assessing the mental health patient's competence to
consent.
Exceptions

Every competent adult has the right to refuse treatment, whether he or she is
suffering from a mental illness or from a physical illness. The judgment in
Fleming v. Reid40 makes it clear that a patient does not forfeit this right as a
result of his or her status as an involuntary patient. There are, however, four
situations in which exception is made to the informed consent rule:
incompetency, emergency, waiver and therapeutic privilege.
Incompetency 41
The common law is silent as to the proper course of action in the case of an
incompetent patient in need of treatment. An incompetent person cannot
consent to treatment; therefore, if this were the only source of law, such a patient

37

Supra note 3.
Supra note 1.
39 Supra note 3 at 86.
40 Supra note 3.
41
Competency is a criteria for a valid consent. As such, it is not an exception to the right
to refuse treatment, but rather a condition precedent to that right. It is noted here,
however, because it is occasionally referred to as an exception in legal commentary.
38
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(in a non-emergency situation) would simply not be treated until he or she had
regained sufficient capacity to consent. Most jurisdictions have passed
legislation investing a public official with the authority to consent on behalf of
an incompetent patient, although in practice the physician usually secures
consent from a spouse or next-of-kin.
The issue of competency is of particular importance in the mental health
field as many psychiatric illnesses impair cognitive functioning; however, many
do not. As discussed above, the autonomy of the mental health patient is
threatened by the mistaken view that rationality is a component of competence
and that a patient's distress may justify limiting the right to refuse treatment. 42
The fact that the majority of Canadian provinces permit the forcible treatment of
competent involuntary patients stems from this view. 43 Incompetence is a
legitimate exception to the physician's duty to obtain informed consent from the
patient, but in the case of the competent psychiatric patient his or her common
law right to refuse treatment is, more often than not, abrogated by statute.
Emergency
At common law, if a delay in treatment will threaten the life or health of the
patient, the physician may proceed without obtaining consent. 44 This exception
does not apply if the patient is competent or has expressed his or her wishes
while capable of consenting. 45 Because the classification of a situation as an
"emergency" absolves the physician of the responsibility to obtain consent, this
exception has significant repercussions on the right to refuse treatment.
Waiver and Therapeutic Privilege
The following remarks from Reihl v. Hughes have been relied on as a
justification for limiting the scope of information given to a patient:
It is, of course, possible that a particular patient may waive
aside any question of risks and be quite prepared to submit to
the surgery or treatment, whatever they may be. Such a
situation presents no difficulty. Again, it may be the case that
a particular patient may, because of emotional factors, be
unable to cope with facts relevant to recommended surgery or
treatment and the doctor may, in such a case, be justified in
42

This approach was employed in lnstitut Philippe Pine! de Montreal v. Dion (1983), 2
D.L.R.(4th) 234; the Quebec Superior Court considered the patient's "irrational" refusal
of treatment as evidence of his incapacity to consent.
43 Supra note 6.
44 Marshall v. Curry, [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260 (N.S.S.C.).
45 Malette v. Shulman, supra note I.
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withholding or generalizing information as to which he would
otherwise be required to be more specific.46

In this statement, the Court makes two exceptions to the general duty to obtain
informed consent. First, a physician is excused from his or her obligation in
circumstances where the patient waives the right to disclosure of material risks.
This exception recognizes that in addition to the right to refuse treatment, the
patient may choose to consent without considering all the available information.
The waiver must be voluntary and "informed," that is, the patient must be aware
that information is being withheld. 47
Second, it is suggested that the normal standard of disclosure may be
restricted where a patient is unable to cope with the facts due to emotional
distress, a doctrine commonly referred to as "therapeutic privilege." The term is
taken from an American rule excusing physicians from the obligation to disclose
the material risks of a procedure when this information could have an adverse
effect on the psychological health of the patient. 48 Doubt has been cast on the
legitimacy of the doctrine of "therapeutic privilege" in Canada. In Hopp v.
Lepp, 49 the Supreme Court recommended that a physician respond to an
apprehensive patient not by withholding information, but by giving a
particularly detailed explanation of the proposed treatment to lessen his or her
anxiety. Case law after Reihl v. Hughes 50 has been inconsistent. The
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Haughian v. Paine 51 referred to the doctrine
but declined to acknowledge its place in Canadian law. A similar approach was
taken by the Ontario High Court in Casey v. Provan and in White v. Turner, 52
although in Hajgato v. London Health Assn. 53 a physician's use of therapeutic
privilege was found to be justified. The clearest statement on this issue is
contained in the recent decision of Meyer v. Rogers. 54 After a thorough review
of American, British, and Canadian sources, the court reached the conclusion
that the doctrine is not applicable in Canada:
The therapeutic privilege exception does not presently form
part of the law of Canada. Furthermore, I do not believe that it
46

Reihl v. Hughes, supra note 4 at 895.
Somerville, "Therapeutic Privilege: Variations on the Theme of Informed
Consent"(l 984), 12 Law, Medicine & Health Care 4 at 6.
48 See Canterbwy v. Spence, 464 F. 2d 772 at 788 (1972).
49 Supra note 21 at 205.
50 Supra note 4.
5! Supra note 27 at 644.
52 Casey v. Provan, supra note 27 at 718; Whitev. Turner, supra note 27 at 289.
53 (1982), 36 O.R.(2d) 669 at 678 (H.C.).
54 (1991), 78 D.L.R.(4th) 307(0nt.H.C.).

47

INFORMED CONSENT

69

should become part of our law because, as I have said, there
has already been an unwarranted extension of the privilege
beyond its original scope which protected patients only from
potential psychological harm .... [T]he privilege has the
potential to 'swallow' the doctor's obligation of disclosure and
thus. to override the requirement for informed consent.ss
Legal commentators have offered support for the application of therapeutic
privilege in very limited circumstances. Margaret Somerville argues the
exception may be invoked only when certain conditions are met:
[I]f the information, normally required would, on the balance
of probabilities, in itself, physically or mentally harm the
particular patient in a serious way and to a significant
degree ... the privilege would not be available unless the
suffering avoided by applying the doctrine at least outweighed
the suffering that resulted from the failure to obtain informed
consent.s6
Similarly, in Canadian Law of Consent to Treatment, s7 the authors assert that
information ought to be withheld or modified when its effect on the patient's
emotional state would increase the risk of the procedure. It must not be withheld
merely because it might upset the patient, or result in the refusal of treatment.s 8
The therapeutic privilege doctrine is of particular concern in the mental
health field. Dr. W.O. McCormick, currently the Medical/Clinical Director of
the Nova Scotia Hospital, supports "therapeutic privilege" in the psychiatric
setting whenever the patient is "likely to be made anxious by full disclosure."s9
This approach infringes unreasonably on patient autonomy. Intense distress may
in fact render a patient incompetent to consent if it has impeded his or her ability
to understand the nature and consequences of treatment, but if this threshold is
not reached, therapeutic privilege should be invoked only when the patient's
emotional state is such that the receipt of the information itself would be
harmful. It is not justified as a means to circumvent a treatment decision with
which the physician disagrees or considers irrational.

THE CHARTER
Until the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 60 in 1982, the
ss Ibid. at 316.
s5 Somerville, supra note 47 at 4-5.
s7 Rozovsky & Rozovsky, supra note 16.
ss Ibid. at 22.
s9 Supra note 35 at 55.
60 Supra note 2.
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development of Canadian mental health law was confined to legislative reform
and statutory interpretation. In contrast, the American Bill of Rights61 gave rise
to considerable litigation on the rights of psychiatric patients during the 1960s
and 70s, resulting in significant changes to both federal and state legislation.
Few constitutional challenges to mental health legislation in Canada have been
launched in the past decade despite the potential protection of the right to refuse
treatment offered by the Charter, particularly in sections 2(b), 12, 15 and 7.
Sections 2(b ), 12, 15 and 7
It may be argued that the purpose or effect of legislation authorizing
compulsory psychiatric treatment is to restrict thought, belief, opinion, or
expression without the patient's consent, thereby violating the patient's
fundamental rights protected under section 2(b):

Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression,
including freedom of the press and other media of
communication.
Although this argument has not yet been used in health-related litigation in
Canada, the First Amendment to the American Bill of Rights, guaranteeing the
right to free speech, was cited by a U.S. court as one ground underlying the
unconstitutionality of involuntary psychosurgery. 62 Section 2(b) of the Charter
extends beyond free speech to include thought, belief, and opinion, and,
therefore, the connection between speech and thought, required in the case of the
First Amendment argument, would be unnecessary in the Canadian context.
Section 12 may also be of some use in challenging provincial health
legislation. The section states:
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment.
In a series of cases during the 1970s, the U.S. Constitutional guarantee of
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment was used to oppose psychiatric
treatments considered particularly intrusive, such as electro-convulsive therapy
(ECT or "shock treatment") and psychosurgery. 63 While several provincial

61
62

U.S. Const. Amend. 1-X

Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063(July10, 1973).
See eg. Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F. 2d 877 (9th Circ.1973); Knecht v. Gillman, 488
F. 2d l 136(8th Circ. 1973); Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb. 1970); Nelson v.
Heyne, 491 F. 2d 352 (7th Circ. 1974.).
63
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statutes in Canada contain special consent provisions to limit the use of these
treatments in the absence of the patient's consent,64 most do not. Furthermore, it
is arguable that other more routine treatment - for example, neuroleptic drug
therapy or solitary isolation - could also be considered "cruel and unusual"
when administered involuntarily. Finally, section 12 of the Canadian Charter
could be used with greater ease than the analogous protection in the American
Bill of Rights as there is no necessity of equating a "treatment" with a
"punishment" - both are expressly included in the Charter.
The disparity between the right of the mentally ill and the right of the
physically ill to refuse treatment may support a Charter challenge on the basis of
Section 15(1):
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on ... mental or physical disability.
As noted above, competency is a criterion for a valid consent. In the majority of
provinces, however, incompetence to consent is expressly or implicitly
presumed in the case of involuntary commitment. This presumption is made
even when incompetency is not a prerequisite to a patient's involuntary
commitment . Statutes that abrogate the common law right to refuse treatment
of competent, although involuntarily detained, psychiatric patients, discriminate
on the basis of mental disability and, therefore, may infringe section 15 of the
Charter.
Although the potential impact of the above-noted Charter provisions on
provincial mental health legislation has yet to be tested before the courts, in the
recent case of Fleming v. Reid ,65 the Ontario Court of Appeal found that
freedom from compulsory treatment, including psychiatric treatment,
is
constitutionally protected under section 7. The section guarantees that,
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
The Court found that a legislative provision authorizing the Review Board of a
psychiatric facility to treat an incompetent involuntary patient, 66 despite the
refusal of the patient's proxy, infringed the patient's section 7 right to security:
64

Hospitals Act, supra note 11, s. 60; Consent to Treatment Act, 1992, S.0. 1992, c. 31,
s. 14; Mental Health Services Act, S.S. 1985-85,c. M-13.1, s. 25(5); Mental Health Act,
R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. M-10, s. 22.
65 Supra note 3.
66 Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, s. 35a.
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The common law right to bodily integrity and personal
autonomy is so entrenched in the traditions of our law as to be
ranked as fundamental and deserving of the highest order of
protection. This right forms an essential part of an
individual's security of the person and must be included in the
liberty interests protected by s. 7. Indeed, in my view, the
-common law right to determine what shall be done with one's
own body and the constitutional right to security of the person,
both of which are founded on the belief in the dignity and
autonomy of the individual, can be treated as coextensive. 67
Fleming v. Reid is the first Canadian decision to clearly extend the common law
right to refuse treatment to mentally ill patients and the first to protect that right
under section 7 of the Charter.

The protection offered by section 7 is subject to restrictions which are "in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Justice Robins
commented that the offending provision might have been upheld had the patient
been provided with a fair hearing, including a consideration of the patient's
wishes while competent, prior to the intervention by the Review Board. 68 The
degree of procedural protection required to meet this standard will depend on the
severity of the infringement in each case.
A summary of legislation provided in the Appendix gives examples of
procedures required by the provinces which restrict or deny the right to refuse
treatment of the mental health patient. Legislation in Manitoba and Alberta
contain provisions similar to the one struck down by the Ontario Court of
Appeal. 69 Several other provinces, such as P.E.I. and Quebec, are silent on the
need to obtain consent for treatment, leaving the determination of patients' rights
to hospital policy. In P.E.I., the only recourse available to involuntary patients is
a review of their admission status. In Quebec, the statute provides no procedural
protection of any kind. The statutes in British Columbia and Newfoundland
expressly deny any right to refuse treatment to involuntary patients, the only
relief available being a successful bid to the Review Board for a discharge. In
the Northwest Territories, a refusal of treatment by the competent involuntary
patient can be overridden by a proxy, and again, the only recourse is an
application for a review of status. This brief review of the provincial mental
health legislation demonstrates that the procedural safeguards they provide are
Fleming, supra note 3 at 88.
Ibid. at 93.
69 Sections 49-50 of the Ontario Mental Health Act, R.S.0. 1990, c. M.7 (previously
R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, s. 35), which authorized the review board to order treatment despite
the refusal of the proxy, were repealed by the Consent and Capacity Statute Law, S.O.
1992, c. 32.
67

68
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inadequate and do not accord with the principles of fundamental justice.

Section 1
The rights set out in the Charter are subject to "such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society."70 In order to satisfy this test, the government must establish, first, that
underlying the legislation is a pressing and substantial objective, and second,
that the ends are proportional to the means. To meet the standard of
proportionality, there must be a rational connection to the objective, a minimal
impairment of the right in question, and a balance between the importance of the
objective and the severity of the effects. 71 An infringement of sections 2(b), 12,
15(1), or 7 can only be justified by meeting the demands of this test. 72 A court
trying to assess whether the compulsory treatment of involuntary patients is a
"reasonable limit" on the rights of the mentally ill must come to terms with a
dilemma basic to the psychiatric patient's situation; in the words of Michael
Bay, "a psychiatric patient has two potentially conflicting interests, namely, the
right to safety and treatment and relief from suffering on the one hand, and the
right to liberty, autonomy and self-determination on the other." 73 It is the
responsibility of the provincial legislatures to balance these interests in mental
health care legislation.
Undoubtedly, the government objective, in expressly restricting the right to
refuse treatment or failing to entrench the requirement to obtain consent in
legislation, is to ensure the "safety and treatment and relief from suffering" of
patients who may be unable to care for themselves or make competent treatment .
decisions. The alternative is to permit individuals to languish in mental
institutions without the treatment that could lead to their release. Presumably,
the courts would consider the relief of mental and physical suffering an
objective of "pressing and substantial" importance.
The real debate is likely to be on the proportionality of the legislation to this
objective. First, the legislation must be rationally connected to the objective; the
onus is on the government to establish both that the legislation is carefully
designed to alleviate the suffering of mental health patients and that it actually
achieves this end. Compulsory treatment, authorized by statute, is likely to have
70

Supra note 2, s.l.
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
72 For the purposes of brevity, the discussion will focus on the traditional formulation of
the Oakes test. It is worth noting, however, that the analysis may vary depending on the
nature of the infringement.
73 Bay, ''Treatment and the Mental Health Act: A Review Board Perspective"(l991) 12
Health Law in Canada 3 at 12.
71
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positive effects on the health of some mental health patients - although it may be
overinclusive - and therefore, is related to the objective of alleviating pain.
However, a statute that ignores the issue of consent, 74 or expressly abrogates the
patient's right to refuse treatment without establishing guidelines on how
treatment decisions can be made on behalf of the patient,75 is not carefully
designed to meet this objective.
Second, the means must minimally impair the right or freedom in question.
If the government's only objective is to protect patients who are not competent
to make treatment decisions for themselves, the legislation in seven out of the
ten provinces, and in both Territories, is overinclusive because it also permits
compulsory treatment of competent patients.
Finally, the severity of the effects must also be proportional to the objective.
Justice Robins in Fleming v. Reid stated that "the common law right to bodily
integrity and personal autonomy is ... fundamental and deserving of the highest
protection." 76 Although the objective may be "pressing and substantial," the
means chosen by the government must be sufficiently connected to this
objective to justify such a serious infringement of the rights of mental health
patients.
In conclusion, the Charter may offer substantial protection to psychiatric
patients, particularly since the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Fleming v. Reid. 11 If the Legislatures fail to take the initiative in bringing mental
health legislation in line with the Charter, it is safe to predict that more
constitutional litigation on the rights of the mentally ill to refuse treatment is in
store in the near future.
LAW REFORM AND THE NOVA SCOTIA HOSPITALS ACT
Most Canadian provinces either implicitly or explicitly authorize the compulsory
treatment of involuntary patients regardless of competency to consent. 78 Mental
health legislation in Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, and Ontario,79 however, offer
three different models for the protection of the right to refuse treatment.
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i.e., Mental Health Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. M-9; Mental Health Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, M-6;
Mental Patients Protection Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. P-41; Mental Health Act, R.S.Y.T. 1986,
c. 115.
75 i.e., Mental Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 256; Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 208;
Mental Health Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. M-10.
76 Supra note 3 at 88.
77 Ibid.
78 Supra note 6.
79 Mental Health Services Act, S.S. 1984-5, c. M 13-1; Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.
208; Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M-7.
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Under the Saskatchewan Mental Health Services Act, 80 incompetency is a
criterion for involuntary commitment, and therefore, the issue of compulsory
treatment of competent involuntary patients does not arise. The physician must
obtain the consent of the voluntary patient, if competent to consent, and if
incompetent, the consent of the patient's nearest relative. 81 The difficulty with
this approach is twofold. First, under section 25(2) of the Act, the attending
physician may treat an involuntary patient - by definition incompetent - without
the consent of any other person acting on the patient's behalf. 82 The right to
refuse treatment loses all meaning since the physician, not having to rely on an
independent patient representative or "substitute consent-giver," has unfettered
discretion to administer treatment. An ethical dilemma may arise as a result of
the potential conflict of interest between the physician's roles as care-giver and
proxy for the patient. Second, a patient's capacity to consent may fluctuate; the
patient may be incompetent when admitted on an involuntary basis, but may
have intervals of competency during his or her term of detainment. The
dilemma here is whether the hospital ought to grant voluntary status temporarily
to the patient during periods of lucidity or run the risk of forcibly treating a
competent patient.
In Nova Scotia, no treatment may be administered without the consent of
the competent patient, 83 and, if the patient is incompetent, consent must be given
by his or her legal guardian, spouse, next of kin, or the Public Trustee. 84 In
short, the Hospitals Act acknowledges the right of the competent adult to refuse
treatment and therefore is not prima facie unconstitutional. The Act, however,
is not sufficiently comprehensive to protect this right in practice. Section 54 of
the Act reads:
54 (I) No person admitted to a hospital shall receive
treatment unless he consents to such treatment.
(2) If a person in a hospital is found by declaration of
incapacity to be incapable of consenting to treatment then that
person may be treated either upon obtaining the consent of the
guardian of that person, if he has one, or if he has not a
guardian upon obtaining the consent of his spouse or next of
kin and where the spouse or next of kin is not available or

80

81
82

83

Mental Health Se11Jices Act, Ibid. s. 24(2).
Ibid. s. 25(1).
Ibid. s. 25(2).
The Nova Scotia Hospitals Act uses the words "competence" to administer one's esta.te

(s.52(3)) and "capacity" to consent to treatment (s.52(2)). This paper employs these terms
interchangeably in reference to the right to refuse treatment.
84 Hospitals Act, supra note 11, s. 54.
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consent is unable to be obtained upon the consent of the Public
Trustee. 85
This provision contains several fundamental deficiencies. First, it fails to define
the scope of informed consent. Second, it lacks criteria or guidelines for
choosing an appropriate proxy to assume decision-making responsibility on
behalf of the patient. In addition, section 54(2) permits the Public Trustee to
override a refusal of treatment by the proxy. Finally, the Act fails to define what
constitutes a true "emergency" situation in which consent is not required.86
The Ontario Mental Health Act, 87 in conjunction with the new Consent to
Treatment Act 1992, 88 is the most effective legislation in Canada on the right of
the mentally ill to refuse treatment. These statutes contain many of the guiding
principles that are lacking in the Nova Scotia Hospitals Act. 89 In passing the
Consent to Treatment Act, 1992, the Ontario Legislature acknowledged the need
to codify the consent process in order to protect the patient's right to make
informed
choices. It is a well-crafted piece of legislation that will
significantly strengthen the rights of the mentally ill to refuse treatment in that
province and provides an excellent model for law reform in Nova Scotia.
The deficiencies in the consent process are examined in detail below with a
view to suggesting ways in which the rights of the mentally ill in Nova Scotia
may be strengthened.
Informed Consent
Section 54(1) calls for "consent" but does not require that it be informed.
Since adequate information is a criterion for valid consent under the common
law, it may be inferred that where the statute is silent as to the requisite quantity
or quality of information, the standard of disclosure set out in Reihl v. Hughes 90
applies. Two faulty assumptions underlie the proposition that this framework
offers sufficient protection. The first is that physicians incorporate common law
principles into their practice as a matter of course, and, second, that the
psychiatric patient has recourse to legal action in the event of a physician failing
to meet his or her legal obligation.
85

Ibid. s. 54.

86 Rozovsky & Rozovosky, supra note 16.
87 Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 262.
88 Consent to Treatment Act 1992, supra note 64. In recent amendments to the Mental
Health Act, made in the Consent and Capacity Statute Law, S.O. 1992, c. 32, consentrelated provisions(i.e. ss. 2-5 and 49-50) were repealed and replaced with references to
the. provisions of the new Consent to Treatment Act, 1992.
89 Supra note 11.
90 Supra note 4.
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With respect to the physician's perception of the law on consent, Michael
Bay noted:
Experience indicates that many physicians hold the belief that
they do not require informed consent. They are of the view
that acquiescence is sufficient and that they are entitled to turn
a blind eye to the issue of competence so long as the patient
does not resist treatment. 91
An empirical study conducted in 1983 indicates that, at that time, 74% of
physicians had never heard of Reihl v. Hughes. 92 Of those doctors who were
aware of the case, 41 % responded that it had had no effect on their practice.93
The author of the study concluded: "Riehl v. Hughes has had little impact on
medical practice with regard to disclosure of risks to patients." 94
The Medical Staff Policy of the Nova Scotia Hospital 95 requires "informed
consent" prior to treatment and emphasizes the importance of ensuring that the
patient understands the information. "Informed consent" is defined as the
disclosure of the "nature of the treatment" which includes the "procedures
involved, risks and benefits associated with it, and the probable outcome." 96 In
contrast, the Abbie J. Lane Hospital has no written policy supplementing the
provisions of the Hospitals Act; 97 in each case, the standard of disclosure is left
to the clinical judgment of the psychiatrist. 98
The fact that the doctrine of informed consent is incorporated into the
formal operating policy of at least one of the two main psychiatric hospitals in
Nova Scotia is encouraging. Nevertheless, it is an inadequate tool for
safeguarding the legal rights of one of the most vulnerable segments of the
population. Despite the current debate over the use of "therapeutic privilege,"
the practice is accepted at the N.S. Hospital. 99 Furthermore, many hospitals
91
92
93

Supra note 73.
Supra note 4.

Robertson, "Informed Consent in Canada: An Empirical Study" (1984) 22 Osgoode
Hall 139.
94 Ibid. at 159. Two American studies came to a similar conclusion regarding the practice
of obtaining informed consent among physicians: Lidz, Charles et al., Informed Consent:
A Study of Decision-Making in Psychiatry, (New York: The Guildford Press), 1984, at
321; K.M. Taylor, M. Kelner, "Informed Consent: The Physician's Perspective"(1987) 24
Social Science and Medicine 135.
95 Medical Staff Policy: Consent for Treatment, Medical Advisory Committee, Nova
Scotia Hospital, December 13, 1989.
96 Ibid. at 2.
97 Supra note 11.
98 Interview with Dr. M. Tihan, Deputy Chief of Psychiatry, Abbie J. Lane Hospital
(March 24, 1992) Halifax.
99 Medical Staff Policy: Examination for Capacity, Office of the Medical/Clinical
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draw a distinction between treatments that require informed consent and more
"routine" procedures that do not, such as behaviour therapy. This type of
classification is common to all hospitals but the issue of where the line is to be
drawn is a matter of some controversy. In this author's opinion, statutory
guidelines are needed to define the scope of informed consent and provide
uniform protection to psychiatric patients throughout the province.
One may argue that regulating psychiatric practice in this manner is an
unreasonable and impractical restriction on clinical judgment, and that current
statutory provisions, supplemented by the psychiatric patient's right to take legal
action in case of a physician's failure to disclose, provide adequate protection.
The assumption, however, that the right to litigate acts as a deterrent to
negligence fails to take into account the disempowerment of the mentally ill in
our society. Archibald Kaiser made the following observations, from a lawyer's
perspective, on the disadvantages of the mentally ill in attempting to defend their
legal rights:
The social class variable intrudes to render the poor client
likely less efficiently communicative, more unsure of the
desired outcome, and either oblivious to attempts at direction
or perhaps unduly eager to follow the lawyer's advice. The
disabilities of the mentally ill client include these problems but
are complicated by her emotional suffering, instability and the
objective existential difficulties of being delegitimized by
being labelled mentally ill and severed from regular contact
with the outside world by institutionalization or treatment. 100
Psychiatric patients are frequently unaware of their rights 101 or, if they are aware,
often do not have the financial means or personal volition to assert them.
Formal legal rights do not always have their intended impact. In May 1991,
a conference, entitled "Voices for Choices: Mental Health Consumers Speak
Out," was held to identify the key mental health issues from the patients'
perspective:
Consumers felt that they were seldom made aware of
Director, Nova Scotia Hospital, November 6, 1989.
100 H.A. Kaiser, "Legal Services for the Mentally Ill: A Polemic and A Plea" (1986) 35
U.N.B.L.J. 89 at 96.
101
A brochure titled the "Rights of Patients and Persons Under Observation" is
distributed to all patients upon admission at the N.S. Hospital. The potential effectiveness
of this document is weakened by the use of legalistic wording. Further, it is noted that the
brochure does not contain any reference to the physician's duty to disclose the material
risks of proposed treatment. The rights listed are taken directly from the statute (rather
than from the common law), an additional indication that statutory guidelines are required
on the scope of informed consent.
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alternative approaches or of the benefits and risks of various
treatments they were offered .... Consumers emphasized again
and again that the operative word in treatment must be wellinformed choice.102
Although the Hospitals Act 103 adheres to the principles of common law and,
prima facie, does not violate the Charter, its practical effect on constitutionally
guaranteed rights is nonetheless subject to scrutiny:
Either an unconstitutional purpose or an unconstitutional effect
can invalidate legislation. All legislation is animated by an
object the legislature intends to achieve. This object is
realized through the impact produced by the operation and
application of the legislation. 104
The statute requires "consent" but does not provide a definition, and the
experience of mental health consumers in Nova Scotia shows that adequate
information is not being provided prior to treatment, consequently nullifying
their right to choose. The assumption that psychiatry is practised in accordance
with the common law where the statute is silent is not borne out. It is
recommended that the Hospitals Act 105 be amended to provide guidelines for
physicians on the proper standard of disclosure.
Only the Ontario Consent to Treatment Act, 1992, 106 which applies equally
to patients governed by the Mental Health Act, 107 provides guidelines for
obtaining informed consent:

5.- (1) The following are the elements required for consent to
treatment:
1. The consent must relate to the treatment.
2. The consent must be informed.
3. The consent must be given voluntarily.
4. The consent must not have been obtained through
misrepresentation or fraud.
(2) A consent is informed if, before giving it,
(a) the person received the information about the
102 Mental Health Consumer Advocacy Network Nova Scotia, "Burning Issues"(draft),
October, 1991, at 2. mhCANns has undertaken a "Consumer-Citizen Community
Mobilization Project" aimed at surveying the needs and attitudes of consumers on a
variety of mental health issues. The results of this study should be very helpful in
identifying problems in the present legislation.
103 Supra note 11.
104 R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] l S.C.R. 295 at 331.
105 Supra note 11.
106 S.O. 1992, c.31.
101 R.S.0. 1990, c. M.7
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treatment, alternative courses of action, the
material effects, risks and side effects in each case
and the consequences of not having the treatment
that a reasonable person in the same circumstances
would require in order to make a decision; and
(b) the health practitioner responded to the person's
requests for other information about the treatment,
alternative courses of action, material effects, risks
and side effects, and consequences of not having
the treatment. 108
This section contains the requisite elements of consent and defines its scope in
accordance with the common law principles set out in Hopp v. Lepp 109 and Reihl
v. Hughes. 110 The mental health legislation in Nova Scotia ought to be revised to
include similar guidelines on the standard of disclosure to ensure 'that psychiatric
patients receive the information needed to make an informed choice with respect
to treatment.
Substitute Decision-Maker
If a patient is declared incapable of consenting to treatment under section
52(2) of the Hospitals Act, 111 the consent of his or her legal guardian, spouse,
next of kin, or the Public Trustee must be obtained to administer treatment. 112
Since the common law does not recognize the need for a proxy to consent on
behalf of an incompetent patient, this statutory provision allows for the treatment
of incompetent patients before an emergency situation arises. Granting the
power of consent to a family member or neutral party, 113 rather than to the
physician or hospital, is preferable for two reasons: first, a family member is
likely to have better knowledge of the patient's wishes, and, second, a third party
proxy avoids the inherent conflict of interest where the physician acts both as
care-giver and consent-giver.
Section 52(2), however, harbours several fundamental flaws. No criteria are
provided to determine an appropriate proxy; an abusive or mentally incompetent
spouse or relative could be granted the power to consent. Other jurisdictions New Brunswick, 114 Alberta 115 and Ontario 116 - have enumerated qualifications
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

s.o. 1992, c. 31, s. 5.
Supra note 21.
Supra note 4.
Supra note 11.
Supra note 11, s. 54(2).
Whether the Public Trustee is in fact neutral is a debatable issue.
Mental Health Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-110 as am. S.N.B. 1989, c. 23, s. 8.6(7).
Mental Health Act, S.A. 1988, c. M-13.1, s. 28 (2). Note thats. 29(3) permits a
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for the consent-giver. In light of these examples, the following amendments to
section 54(2) of the Hospitals Act 117 are recommended: the proxy must be
mentally competent and over the age of sixteen, in personal contact with the
patient within the preceding twelve months, and willing to assume the
responsibility for making the treatment decision. He or she must identify, in a
written statement, his or her relationship with the patient and indicate that there
is no reason to believe that the patient might object to the proxy giving or
withholding substitute consent. The Nova Scotia legislation should also rank
potential consent-givers in order to avoid a conflict between family members
claiming this authority and to prevent a physician from responding to a refusal
by seeking out a more cooperative proxy. The priority of claims should be
defined in the following order: legal guardian, appointed representative, 118
spouse, child, parent, brother or sister, any other next of kin, and finally the
Public Trustee.
It is crucial that where a proxy refuses treatment on the patient's behalf, the
subsequent consent of a person further down the list not be considered valid. In
Re. Boudreau, 119 the Nova Scotia Supreme Court interpreted the words in
section 54(2), "consent is unable to be obtained," to mean that the Public Trustee
has the authority to consent if the next of kin is unavailable or refuses treatment.
In practice, this route is considered a last resort due to the substantial
documentation required for an application to the Public Trustee. 120 Nevertheless,
the statutory power given to the Public Trustee to override the authority of the
next of kin whenever consent is withheld grossly undermines the family's role in
the treatment of an incompetent patient. Furthermore, the recent judgment in
Fleming v. Reid 121 indicates that the absence of procedural safeguards is
probably unconstitutional. The discretion granted to the Public Trustee is
unfettered: no hearing is needed to justify the Trustee's interference and,
statutory review panel to oveffide the refusal of a competent involuntary patient or proxy
for an incompetent involuntary patient, if the panel considers it to be in that patient's best
interests. This is similar to the provision in the Ontario Mental Health Act struck down by
the Court of Appeal in Fleming v. Reid, supra note 3 (except the offending provision in
the Ontario statute applied only to incompetent, involuntary patients). This same power is
granted to a review board by the Manitoba Mental Health Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. M-110, s.
25(1) as am. S.M. 1987-88, c. 56.
116 Consent to Treatment Act, 1992, supra note 64, s. 17.
117 Supra note 11.
118 Pursuant to the Medical Consent Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.279.
119 Re. Boudreau (1981), 43 N.S.R.(2d) 212 (S.C.T.D.).
120 Interview with E. Theriault, Public Trustee (9 March, 1992) Halifax. This view was
also put forth in an interview with the Director of Clinical/Medical Services at the Nova
Scotia Hospital (18 March , 1992) Halifax.
121 Supra note 3.
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al though submissions are required from the doctor and hospital, no formal policy
or statutory guidelines are available to assist the Public Trustee in reaching a
decision. 122
The Nova Scotia Medical Consent Act 123 is designed to avoid the practical
difficulties related to substitute consent by authorizing the appointment of a
proxy by a competent adult in case he or she becomes incapable of giving a
valid consent to treatment. While it is a step in the right direction, the Act
sanctions only "proxy directives," not "instruction directives" 124 - otherwise
known as "living wills." The proxy may be appointed but is not bound by
statute to follow directions given by the person on whose behalf he or she is
acting. 125 Case law suggests, however, that such a document might be binding
at common law. The Ontario Court of Appeal ruled in Malette v.Shulman 126 that
a written advance directive constitutes a refusal of treatment which the physician
is legally obligated to respect. In Fleming v. Reid, 127 the same court decided that
a patient's prior wishes must be taken into consideration when determining his
or her "best interests."
Nevertheless, given the uncertainty as to the legal effect of an instruction
directive, the Hospitals Act128 ought to provide more precise guidelines for
substitute decision-making. Two standards may be used in establishing such
guidelines: "best interests" - that is, an objective assessment of what is in the
patient's best interests - and "substituted judgment" - where the proxy is
required to "stand in the shoes" of the patient. To stand in the patient's shoes
the proxy must follow explicit instructions, and if the wishes of the patient are
not known, the proxy must then draw on his or her personal knowledge of the
patient to make the decision the patient would have made if competent. Only if
the proxy has no such knowledge should the decision then be made according to
the patient's "best interests."
Three provinces - Ontario, New Brunswick, and Alberta - have adopted
guidelines concerning substitute consent. Alberta and New Brunswick use
similar tests based on the strict "best interests" model. The Alberta legislation
contains the following provision:

122

Supra note 120.
Medical Consent Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 279.
124 Downie, "'Where There is a Will, There May Be a Better Way': Legislating Advance
Directives" (1992), 12 Health Law in Canada 73.
125 The Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, C. 30 is the only Canadian legislation
which, in conjunction with the Consent to Treatment Act, 1992, enforces "living wills."
126 Supra note 1.
127 Supra note 3.
128 Supra note 11.
123
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Sec. 28 (3) A person authorized by subsection (l)(b) to make
treatment decisions on behalf of a formal patient shall make
the decisions in accordance with what the person believes to
be the best interest of the patient.
(4) In order to determine the best interest of the formal
patient in relation to treatment, a person referred to in
subsection (l)(b) shall have regard to the following:
(a) whether or not the mental condition of the patient
will be or is likely to be improved by the treatment;
(b) whether the patient's condition will deteriorate or
is likely to deteriorate without the treatment;
(c) whether or not the anticipated benefit from the
treatment outweighs the risk of harm to the patient;
(d) whether or not the treatment is the least restrictive
and least intrusive treatment that meets the
requirements of clauses (a),(b) and (c). 129
Personal characteristics that may have influenced the patient's choice had he or
she been competent to consent are not considered; rather, what is determinative
are those factors which a reasonable physician would take into account when
making a decision to treat.
In Ontario, the decision-maker is to act in the patient's "best interests" only
if there is no knowledge of instructions or wishes regarding treatment:
13.-( I) A person who gives or refuses consent on an incapable
person's behalf shall do so in accordance with the following
principles:
1. If the person knows of a wish applicable to the
circumstances that the incapable person expressed while
capable and after attaining sixteen years of age, the person
shall give or refuse consent in accordance with the wish.
2. If the person does not know of a wish applicable to the
circumstances that the incapable person expressed while
capable and after attaining sixteen years of age, the person
shall act in the incapable person's best interests.
Furthermore, the definition of "best interests" is not restricted to what is best to
preserve the physical health of the patient:
13.-(2) In deciding what an incapable person's best interests
are, the person who gives or refuses consent on his or her
behalf shall take into consideration,
(a) the values and beliefs that the person knows the incapable
person held when capable and believes he or she would still
act on if capable;
129

Mental Health Act, S.A. 1988,c. M-13.1, s. 28(3) and (4).
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(b) any wishes expressed by the incapable person with respect
to the treatment that are not required to be followed under
paragraph 1 of subsection (l); and
(c) the following factors:
1. Whether the incapable person's condition or well-being is
likely to be improved by the treatment.
2. Whether the person's condition or well-being is likely to
improve without the treatment.
3. Whether the benefit the person is expected to obtain from
the treatment outweighs the risk of harm to him or her.
4. Whether a less restrictive or less intrusive treatment would
be as beneficial as the treatment that is proposed. 130
This approach reflects the recognition by the Ontario Court of Appeal, in
Malette v. Schulman 131 and Fleming v. Reid, 132 that a person's physical health is
not necessarily one's primary concern and that the right to refuse treatment is
not limited by an objective assessment of the rationality of that decision.
The Hospitals Act133 does not provide any guidance of this kind, and the
Public Trustee is not directed to take any particular factors into consideration in
making a decision. During an interview, the current Public Trustee indicated
that she will usually assess the recommended treatment based on the anticipated
consequences of giving or refusing consent to the health of the patient. These
factors reflect a "best interests" standard. 134 The appropriate criteria for making
such a decision is clearly a matter of public policy and ought to be addressed in
the statute in order to preclude the risk of an arbitrary veto by the Public Trustee
of a proxy's refusal to consent. It should not be left to the judgment of one
individual. 135 The Hospitals Act136 must enumerate the duties of any substitute
consent-giver, whether family member, proxy, or Public Trustee, in order to
protect the interests of the incompetent patient.
Emergency

At common law, consent need not be obtained in an emergency. 137 This
exception is a form of implied consent; therefore, the physician cannot proceed

° Consent to Treatment Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 31, s.13.

13

131

Supra note I.
Supra note 3.
133 Supra note 11.
134
Supra note 120.
135 The Public Trustee must obtain the permission of the Supreme Court to consent on an
ex parte application pursuant to s. 9(1) of the Hospitals Act.
136 Supra note 11.
137 Marshall v. Curry, supra note 44.
132
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in the face of an express refusal of the treatment. 138 If a situation is classified as
an emergency, none of the issues discussed above regarding informed consent
are relevant, and hence, the definition of this term is particularly important if
patient autonomy is to be preserved.
Generally, an "emergency" is defined as "a life- or health-threatening
situation requiring immediate treatment." 139 It is not sufficient that immediate
treatment is more convenient or medically proper; treatment must be delayed
until consent can be obtained unless the delay would threaten the life or health of
the patient. If the definition of "threat" is construed broadly, it could be taken to
mean that an emergency situation arises whenever a delay in treatment would
result in any deterioration in the patient's condition, allowing the physician to
forcibly administer treatment without seeking the consent of a proxy. Statutory
guidance is required to narrow the discretion conferred on the attending
physician in deciding when "emergency" treatment is justified.
The Hospitals Act' 40 does not make any reference to emergency treatment,
let alone define its meaning. A definition is provided, however, in the Medical
Staff Policy of the Nova Scotia Hospital:
Consent for treatment is not required for a psychiatric or
medical emergency. For treatment purposes, a medical or
psychiatric emergency is a situation where the withholding of
treatment, in the clinical judgement of the physician would
lead to:
i) Imminent danger of violence to other persons or the
patient's environment or to the patient himself, or
ii) Serious or permanent impairment of the patient's own
health, or
iii) Substantial deterioration in the patient's condition which is
likely to lead to either (i) or (ii) in the immediate future. 141
The practice at the N.S. Hospital is to forcibly treat a patient if the failure to do
so would result in a deterioration of the patient's health or an increase in the risk
of violence. On these grounds a competent patient who withholds consent could
be forcibly treated, a practice clearly contrary to the decision in Malette v.
Schulman 142 recognizing the right of the competent individual to refuse treatment
Malette v. Schulman, supra note I.
Rozovsky & Rozovsky, supra note 16 at 19.
Supra note 11.
Medical Staff Policy: Consent for Treatment, Medical Advisory Committee, Nova
Scotia Hospital, 13 December, 1989. The Abbie J. Lane Hospital has no formal policy
supplementing the terms of the Hospitals Act. (Dr. Michael Tihan, interviewed 24 March,
1992).
142 Supra note I.
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regardless of the consequences.
The mental health legislation in the Northwest Territories, Manitoba, and
Ontario define the scope of the "emergency" exception. In the N.W.T. Mental
Health Act, emergency treatment is permitted in the following circumstances:
20(1) A medical practitioner who examines a person under
section 13 or assesses a person under section 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12
may administer emergency medical or psychiatric treatment to
the person being examined or assessed where ....
(b) the person has attained the age of majority and is
mentally competent to give a valid consent, and
refuses to consent or, where the person has not
attained the age of majority or is not mentally
competent to give a valid consent, and the person's
nearest relative refuses to consent and
(i)
the treatment is necessary to preserve the life
or mental or physical health of that person,
(ii)
the failure to give the treatment or delay in
giving the treatment would create a reasonably
foreseeable risk of injury to that person or any
other person, and
(iii) the treatment cannot reasonably be delayed
through alternative means of detention. 143
Certain flaws in this provision lessen its usefulness as a model for law reform.
The section permits forcible treatment in the event of an express refusal which is
clearly contrary to the common law 144 and violates section 7 of the Charter. 145
In addition, the physician may proceed without consent if the treatment is
deemed necessary to preserve the patient's health and failure to proceed would
likely result in injury. Yet the type of foreseeable injury sufficient to invoke the
provision is not defined. Non-consensual treatment is an extraordinary remedy
which should only be used in extreme circumstances, but this view is not
reflected in the wording of the legislation.
The Ontario Consent to Treatment Act, 1992 146 contains certain elements
recommended for inclusion in the Nova Scotia Hospitals Act:
23. (1) Despite sections 4 and 21, a health practitioner may
administer treatment to a person without consent if, in his or
143 Mental Health Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. M-10, s. 20(1). A similar provision is
contained in the Mental Health Act, R.S.Y.T. 1986, c. 115, s. 7; that statute, however,
does not expressly require consent to treat any patient, and does not clearly distinguish
between competence and incompetence.
144 Malette v. Schulman, supra note I.
14
5 Fleming v. Reid, supra note 3.
146
s.o. 1992, c. 31.
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her opinion,
(a) the person is incapable with respect to the treatment;
(b) the person is experiencing severe suffering or is at risk, if
the treatment is not administered promptly, of suffering
serious bodily harm; and
(c) it is not reasonably possible to obtain a consent or refusal
on the person's behalf, or the delay required to do so will
prolong the suffering that the person is experiencing or will
put the person at risk of suffering serious bodily harm. 147
While the scope of the "emergency" described in this legislation limits its
application to persons incapable of consenting, it is not as precise as the
definition given in the Manitoba Mental Health Act 148 regarding the degree of
foreseeable bodily harm necessary to justify intervention. The Manitoba Act
excuses the physician from seeking consent from a patient who is mentally
incompetent or under the age of 18 if there is "imminent and serious danger to
the life, a limb or a vital organ of the patient requiring immediate treatment," 149
and thus confines the applicability of this exception to extreme circumstances.
Several other provisions in the Ontario statute strengthen the protection
offered to patients in the "emergency" situation. The physician must make
efforts to find a person authorized to consent and may continue emergency
treatment for as long as is reasonably necessary to find a willing proxy . 150 In
addition, emergency treatment is not authorized if the physician has reasonable
grounds to believe that the patient expressed a wish, while capable, to refuse
treatment in those circumstances. 151 Finally, the physician is permitted to
override the refusal of a proxy only if an emergency situation exists and if the
physician believes that the person who refused consent failed to follow the
guidelines for substitute decision-making set out in section 13 of the Act. 152
The scope of the "emergency" exception is a legal, not a medical issue. Its
application must be governed by the law and not by the policies of individual
hospitals or the clinical judgment of physicians. The Hospitals Act153 should be
amended to include a definition of "emergency" similar to that in Ontario
legislation, but supplemented by a more precise definition of "serious bodily
harm" such as that found in the Manitoba Mental Health Act, in order to ensure
that the patient's right to self-determination will be respected in practice.
147
148
149
l50
151
152
153

Supra note 11, s. 23(1). ·
Mental Health Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. M-1 IO.
Ibid. s. 24(7).
Consent to Treatment Act, I992, supra note 64, ss. 23(6),23(7).
Ibid. s. 24.
Ibid. s. 25.
Supra note 11.
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Unlike the mental health legislation in other Canadian provinces, the Hospitals
Act, 154 prima facie, does not violate the Charter or counter the long-standing
common law right to refuse treatment. While the Act appears to resolve
fundamental questions of social policy, it does not provide the means to carry
that policy into practice. A wide discretion is conferred on physicians in
conducting the consent process, the majority of whom , evidence shows, 155 are
unaware or unaffected by the judgments of the Supreme Court on informed
consent. 156 The failure of the Hospitals Act 157 to provide guidance to physicians
results in inconsistent and inadequate protection of the rights of psychiatric
patients in Nova Scotia: To remedy this situation, it is advised that the following
recommendations be adopted:
1. Amendment of section 54 to require "informed consent"
to be obtained from the competent patient, or substitute
decision-maker in the case of an incompetent patient.

2. Enumeration of the elements of consent.
Model:
a) The consent must relate to the particular treatment.
b) The consent must be informed.
c) The consent must be voluntary.
3. Enumeration of the standard of disclosure.
Model:
a) Material risks and side effects.
b) Benefits of the treatment.
c) Alternative courses of action.
d) Any other information that a reasonable person in the same
circumstances would require to make an informed decision.
4.

Explicit rejection of the "therapeutic privilege" doctrine.

5. Enumeration of prerequisites required of a proxy chosen
under s. 54(2).
Model:
a) Mentally competent.
b) Over the age of sixteen.
c) In personal contact with the patient within the preceding
154
155
156
157

Ibid.
G. Robertson, supra note 25.
Reihl v. Hughes, supra note 4; Hopp v. Lepp, supra note 21.
Supra note 11.
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twelve months.
d) Willing to assume responsibility for treatment decision.
e) No reason to believe that the patient would object to the
appointment.
6. Prioritized listing of potential candidates for proxy.
Model:
a) legal guardian
b) appointed representative under Medical Consent Act
c) spouse
d) child
e) parent
f) brother or sister
g) any other next of kin
h) Public Trustee
7. Declaration that if one candidate for proxy refuses the
treatment and another consents, the decision of the person who
appears first on the above-noted list is valid and final.
8. Amendment of the Medical Consent Act to ensure that the
instructions given by a competent person to his or her
appointed representative will be followed.
9. Enumeration of the duties of a proxy.
Model:
a) Must follow written instructions drafted pursuant to the
Medical Consent Act (amended).
b) If no written instructions, must follow the patient's wishes
while competent, if known.
c) If the specific wishes of the patient are not known, act in
accordance with the values and beliefs of the patient.
d) If none of the information above is available, act in
accordance with the best interests.
e) The patient's best interests are to be determined by
i) whether the mental condition of the patient will be or is
likely to be improved by the treatment;
ii) whether the patient's condition will deteriorate or is likely
to deteriorate without treatment;
iii) whether the anticipated benefit from the treatment
outweighs the risk of harm to the patient;
iv) whether the treatment is the least restrictive and least
intrusive treatment that meets the requirements of clauses (i),
(ii) and (iii).
10. Definition of the "emergency" exception.
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Model:

a) Patient incompetent or incapable of consenting.
b) Patient likely to suffer serious bodily harm if treatment
delayed.
c) "Serious bodily harm" is a serious danger to the life, limb,
or a vital organ of the patient.
d) The physician is not permitted to proceed if the patient has
expressly refused the treatment while competent.
Affirming the absolute right of the competent psychiatric patient to refuse
treatment under any circumstances, providing guidance for substitute decisionmaking, and limiting the application of "emergency treatment" are steps
recommended in order to empower a highly vulnerable and stigmatized group in
modern society. The purpose of these recommendations is not to abolish the
power of the state but rather to maximize patient autonomy. It is the
responsibility of the Nova Scotia Legislature to balance the potential conflict
between "the right to safety and treatment and relief from suffering on the one
hand, and the right to liberty.autonomy and self-determination on the other." 158
These proposals are aimed at achieving that balance.

l58

Bay, supra note 73 at 12.
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APPENDIX
Summary of Provincial Statutes that Abrogate Common Law Rights

1) Mental Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 256 as am. S.B.C. 1981, c. 21, s. 48:
This legislation contains no provision for assessment of competency. Under
section 25.2, however, if a patient is involuntarily detained, "treatment
authorized by the director shall be deemed to be given with the consent of the
person." The patient may apply to provincial court for a discharge from the
facility (s. 27), but no mechanism is provided for challenging treatment
decisions.
2) Mental Health Act, R.S.M. 1987, c.M-110 as am. S.M. 1987-88, c. 56, S.M.
1991-92, c. 4: The patient, or proxy for the incompetent patient (s. 24.2(1)), has
the right to refuse treatment under s. 24(1 ); however, if an involuntary patient
withholds consent, the physician may apply to the Review Board for
authorization to forcibly administer treatment(s. 25(1)). Application may be
made by the patient to the Review Board regarding the patient's status or the
determination of incompetency(26.5(1).
3) Mental Health Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-10, as am. S.N.B. 1989, c. 23:
"Routine clinical medical treatment" may be given to a competent involuntary
patient without consent if it is considered in the patient's "best interests"(s.
8.11 ). The patient (or a representative) may apply for a review of his or her
status(s. 31(1)) or challenge whether the treatment given is in fact "routine
clinical treatment"(s. 31.1(1)).
4) Mental Health Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. M-9: Anyone involuntarily detained under
this legislation may also be forcibly treated(s. 6). The patient may file an
application for a discharge from the institution with the review board(s. 16).
5) Mental Health Act, S.A. 1988,c. M-13.1: The competent patient is given the
right to make treatment decisions; however, refusal of treatment by an
involuntary patient may be overridden by the review board if the treatment is
considered to be in the patient's "best interests"(s. 29).
6) Mental Health Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. M-6: No reference is made to
competence or the need for consent to treatment in this legislation. The power
to forcibly administer treatment to patients held against their will can be implied.
An involuntary patient may apply to the review board to determine whether he
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or she meets the criteria for compulsory admission(s. 25).
7) Mental Patients Protection Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. P-41: The need to obtain
consent for treatment is not referred to in this legislation, although the rights of
patients are enumerated. The power to impose treatment on involuntary patients
may be implied by the use of the term "close treatment" to describe compulsory
admission.
8) Mental Health Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. M-10: Competent patients have the
right to refuse treatment (s. 21(a)); however, if an involuntary patient withholds
consent, regardless of competence, the treatment may be administered with the
consent of an appointed proxy(s. 21(b)). Further, the hospital may proceed with
emergency treatment of a competent involuntary patient regardless of his or her
refusal(s.20(1)(b)). An application may be made to the Supreme Court to review
the decision to involuntarily detain a patient(s. 26).
9) Mental Health Act, R.S.Y.T. 1986, c. 115: The general requirement to obtain
consent from competent patients is not explicit but may be implied from the
exceptions enumerated in the legislation. One such exception is the power to
administer emergency treatment to the involuntary patient without his or her
consent, regardless of competence (s. 7(1)). The patient may apply to the review
board for an inquiry into his or her detention (s. 8(2)).

